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This return migration was due to 
two main factors. First, many people 
were eager to move to remote regions 
in order to earn high wages. Now, 
however, special compensation for 
isolation, difficult conditions, and se- 
vere climate is no longer available. Sec- 
ond, uncertainty has recently grown 
about whether their apartments in 
their places of origin will continue to 
be reserved for them and about 
whether they will receive privileges 
(such as higher old-age pensions) that 
a northern work record is supposed to 
give them. Suddenly everything is un- 
certain because each former Soviet re- 
public has passed new laws governing 
such matters-but without coordinat- 
ing them with the laws of the other 
former Soviet republics. 
Population decreases in the areas of 
the Russian North became especially 
grave in 1992 (See Table 4). 
Return migration has thus taken on 
massive proportions. It will undoubt- 
edly have a damaging impact on the 
Russian economy and social life, and 
will jeopardize the further develop- 
ment of the Russian North, Siberia and 
the Far East. On the other hand, the 
European part of Russia and the Ural 
region, which are receiving these mi- 
grants, will suffer from a labour sur- 
plus and unemployment. 
Table 4: Population Decrease 
in the Russia North in 1992 
Out- Increase 
Region Migration since '91 
Tumen 50,000 9,000 
Magadan 38,000 20,000 
Yakutia 34,000 6,000 
Murmansk 29,000 13,000 
Chukotka zZ,Ooo 13,000 
Chitinsk 21,000 11,000 
Khabarovsk 16,000 14,000 
Amur 16,000 12,000 
;ource: State Statistics Committee of the 
Russian Federation. 
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3. Migration Exchange With the 
Countries of the "Near Abroad" 
and the Policy of de-Russification 
Russia is now experiencing a positive 
migration balance with all the coun- 
tries of the near abroad apart from 
Ukraine and Belarus (see Table 5). In 
addition to the arrival of people from 
the North, Siberia and the-Far East, 
other migrants are coming from Cen- 
tral Asia, Transcaucasia and the 
Baltics. Among the migrants, the per- 
centage of refugees is constantly grow- 
ing. Estimates of the number of 
refugees on the territory of Russia as of 
January 1,1993 vary from 363,000 (ac- 
cording to the Ministry of Internal Af- 
fairs) to 460,000 (according to the 
Federal Migration Service). 
The ethnic composition of the mi- 
grant population in 1992 has been 
estimated by the State Statistics Com- 
mittee of the Russian Federation to be 
44 percent Russian, 18 percent Arme- 
nian, 8 percent Meskhetian Turkish, 
7.9 percent Osetian and 2.5 percent 
A ~ e r i . ~  
The main factors causing the vari- 
ous migration streams are all 
outgrowths of the collapse of the So- 
viet Union. They include: the socioeco- 
nomic crisis; the aggravation of ethnic 
relations; the activities of nationalist 
parties and groups; and the passage of 
discriminatory citizenship and lan- 
guage laws by the new states. Accord- 
ing to a 1991 survey of 91,100 migrants 
to Russia, the aggravation of national 
relations was one of the most impor- 
tant factors on this list.6 Specifically, 70 
percent of respondents from 
Azerbaijan, 64 percent from Tajikistan, 
63 percent from Georgia, 50 percent 
from Armenia, 47 percent from Kyr- 
gyzstan, 45 percent from Latvia and 36 
percent from Moldava said that ethnic 
conflict was the most important reason 
they migrated. 
Sixty-five percent of the respond- 
ents who cited the aggravation of eth- 
nic relations as a reason for migrating 
were Russians. Internal migrants in 
Russia who left their homes because of 
ethnic conflicts were mainly from 
Chechen-Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tuva 
and North Osetia; and fully 78 percent 
of them were of Russian background. 
One can detect the indirect influ- 
ence of ethnic strife on the decision to 
migrate even when respondents said 
they left mainly for other reasons. For 
example, among migrants from Latvia, 
a common reason for leaving was the 
need to change one's place of work. 
But 38 percent of the respondents from 
Latvia indicated that it was necessary 
to change work because of the new 
state-imposed demand for fluency in 
Latvian. Similar responses were given 
by 34 percent of respondents from 
Tajikistan, 25 percent from Kyrgyzs- 
tan, 23 percent from Uzbekistan, 33 
percent from Lithuania, 31 percent 
from Estonia and 22 percent from 
Georgia. Forty-three percent of the re- 
spondents said they did not know the 
language of the titular national group7 
in the former Soviet republic where 
they had resided and 17 percent said 
they had weak knowledge of the lan- 
guage. Among those who cited wors- 
ening ethnic relations as the main 
reason for migrating, the corresponding 
figures were 49 percent and 23 percent. 
Given the worsening socioeco- 
nomic situation and the intensifying 
mobilization of national-political sen- 
timent, we can expect a considerable 
rise in the migration of Russians from 
the former ex-Soviet republics and 
from the internal autonomous regions 
of Russia over the next four to five 
years. Experts estimate that due to lin- 
guistic discrimination and related 
causes, between 400,000 and 2,000,000 
migrants will arrive in Russia annually 
over that period. This represents as 
much as a third of the migration poten- 
tial of the Russian people residing in 
the territory of the former Soviet Un- 
ion outside R ~ s s i a . ~  (A total of 25.3 
million Russians now live in the near 
abroad.) 
4 Rqfkge, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 1994) 
The high migration potential of Rus- 
sians in the former republics of the 
USSR is evident from a 1992 survey 
carried out by the Institute of Problems 
of Employment of the Russian Acad- 
emy of Science, in which 1,948 Russian 
families from Vilnius, Dushanbe, 
Dagestan, Kiev, Kazan, Western 
Ukraine and Tashkent were inter- 
viewed. In Dushanbe, fully 81 percent 
of the respondents said they wish to 
leave. In Dagestan the figure was 63 
percent, in Tashkent 59 percent, and in 
Western Ukraine 35 percent. The situ- 
ation is more stable in Kazan, where 22 
percent of the respondents said they 
wish to leave. In Kiev the figure was 20 
percent and in Vilnius 14 percent. 
Eighty percent of the potential mi- 
grants from Dushanbe, Tashkent, 
Dagestan and Kazan said they wanted 
to go to Russia and no other country. 
Among potential migrants from 
Lithuania the corresponding figure 
was 60 percent and from the Ukraine 
about 33 percent? 
The emigration potential of the Rus- 
sians will not be fully realized because 
alongside the forces that drive people 
from the former republics are some 
that make them remain where they are. 
Many Russians have lived outside of 
Russia for many years and have 
adapted and assimilated there. More- 
over, due to the crisis in the Russian 
economy and the impoverishment of 
the Russian population there is no 
guarantee that migration will be easy. 
Finally, potential migrants have very 
little hope that they will be legally pro- 
tected and that the rights of forced 
migrants will be observed. Their fate 
could become easier if each state in the 
region reaches an international agree- 
ment providing the migrants with 
Republic 1989 
Ukraine -30.0 
Belarus -11.9 
Moldava 5.2 
Kazakhstan 35.3 
Lithuania -0.1 
Latvia 1.2 
Estonia 0.3 
Baltic subtotal 1.4 
Uzbekistan 49.3 
Kyrgyzstan 3.4 
Tajikistan 6.8 
Turkmenistan 2.9 
Central Asia 
subtotal 57.0 
Azerbaijan 45.0 
Armenia 12.2 
Georgia 15.9 
Transcaucasus 
subtotal 73.1 
Refugees not identified 
by state 0 
Total 130.1 
transportation, property compensation 
and pensions. The 
1 Table 5: Net Migration Balance Between Russia and the other Republics of the Former USSR, 1989-92 (in thousands) 
Source: State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation 
~ u k i a n s  in the 
near abroad are 
justifiably out- 
raged because 
Russia has aban- 
doned them and 
does not protect 
them. In many of 
the new states 
American em- 
bassies opened 
up much earlier 
than Russian em- 
bassies. 
In Russia itself 
life is very diffi- 
cult for the refu- 
gees. The Supreme 
Soviet of the Rus- 
sian Federation 
has passed a law 
regarding refu- 
gees and forced 
migrants but it 
has not been im- 
plemented. Refu- 
gees are 
completely un- 
protected by law 
when local bu- 
reaucrats con- 
front them. 
Migrants also suffer from not being 
free to choose where they can settle. 
They are restricted by job opportuni- 
ties, lack of housing and lack of a resi- 
dence permit (propiska). Russians in the 
ex-Soviet republics live mainly in the 
big cities, very often in the capitals of 
the new countries. They are mainly 
professionals, academics and highly 
qualified workers. But the Russian 
government is trying to settle them in 
backward rural areas. 
Thus, the former republics of the 
Soviet Union are practising a policy of 
open or hidden de-Russification. This 
escalates social tension. Such condi- 
tions require action on the part of the 
government of the Russian Federation 
to protect the rights of its citizens and 
institute a well-defined program for 
admitting forced migrants and refu- 
gees. 
4. Migration inside Russia and the 
growth of regional separatism1° 
The further complication of the socio- 
political situation in various regions of 
Russia-notably Chechen-Ingushetia, 
Dagestan, Tuva, North Osetia and 
Tatarstan-could easily intensify mi- 
gration and stimulate a policy of ethnic 
cleansing. Thus the expulsion of non- 
native people (mainly Russians) is a 
direct consequence of the sociopoliti- 
cal crisis and at the same time the rea- 
son for its further intensification. 
Some 11.8 million Russians live in 
the various autonomous republics lo- 
cated within Russiaitself. Most of them 
live in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. 
Smaller but significant numbers live in 
Yakutia-Sakha, Mordovia, and 
Karelia. Their social status is declin- 
ing. They now have less opportunity to 
be admitted to administrative posi- 
tions. Native people are far better rep- 
resented even if their representation in 
the general population is quite small. 
Interethnic relations in Russia today 
closely resemble the situation in the 
USSR on the eve of its fall. The ongoing 
crisis allows local elites to manipulate 
public opinion and create the image of 
independent "emirates" which are free 
to sell their raw materials. Nationalism 
and the instinct for self-presekation 
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stimulate the ideology of ethnic supe- 
riority. Ethnic strangers are strongly 
rejected, and Russians are thus drawn 
into ethnic conflict. Between 1991 and 
1992 the number of Russians who con- 
fronted national intolerance has 
grown dramatically, as indicated by 
the survey research summarized in 
Table 6. 
It has become the general feeling of 
the people of Russia that their national 
interests are not taken into account. 
For example, in a recent survey, 45 
percent of Cherkessk's inhabitants, 37 
percent of Ufa's, 35 percent of Ulan- 
Ude's and 31 percent of Yakutsk's 
population agreed that their national 
interests are either fully or partially 
ignored. It is important to note in this 
connection that among representa- 
tives of the titular nationalities this 
opinion is one-and-a-half to two times 
more widespread than among ethnic 
minorities. 
The desire to protect one's national 
interests creates the sociopsycho- 
logical preconditions for a policy of 
national revanchism. During the last 
few years one can discern a marked 
upsurge of the priority of the nation's 
rights over the rights of the individual. 
This feeling is especially strong in the 
regions where national tension is esca- 
lating. For example, among the 
Cherkess and Karachaev people, 30 
percent of those surveyed approved of 
the idea of the priority of the nation's 
rights over the rights of the individual. 
Relatedly, in 1992 members of the na- 
tive ethnic groups of the internal Rus- 
sian republics were appointed to 
leading positions twice as frequently 
as in 1991. 
In general, ethnic background has 
started to play an extremely important 
role regarding the selection of candi- 
dates for leading administrative jobs, 
prestigious positions, and for the allo- 
cation of financial and material ben- 
efits. This encourages a highly 
negative attitude toward migrants. Ac- 
tions of the Russian Federation to sta- 
bilize ethic relations are held in very 
low regard. Forty-five percent of re- 
spondents stated that such actions are 
late, hasty, lacking in thought, and, 
indeed, are sometimes the source of 
conflict. As a logical extension of sepa- 
ratist tendencies that add pressure to 
migration, many inhabitants of Russia 
hold that independent autonomous re- 
gions are not really part of the country 
(see Table 7). 
Due to the worsening economic 
crisis and the spread of ethnocentric 
ideology, a serious 
difference in under- 
standing the essential 
features of national and 
state institutions is ris- 
ing to the surface. This 
difference often turns 
into heated arguments 
when constitutional 
principles are dis- 
cussed. In general, the 
spread of ethnocentrism 
and separatism ruins 
the society and demor- 
alizes people who are at- 
tempting to consolidate 
it. The idea that the 
power of the titular eth- 
nic group needs to be 
augmented leads to 
deep conflict among 
-- 
Table 6 Russians who Confront Ethnic Prejudice and Hostility 
in their Daily Lives (in percent) 
Stavropol Orenburg Moscow 
1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992 
National prejudice 19 38 18 42 17 35 
Hostilityt 36 54 17 29 35 40 
Wostility to people of other nationalities and to migrants. 
Source Surveys conducted by the Centre of Sociology of Interethnic 
Relations, Institute of Saciopolitical Research, Russian Academy of 
Science. 
various ethnic groups, jeopardizes eth- 
nic relations, stimulates migration and 
increases xenophobia. It can eventu- 
ally create the danger of eliminating 
Russia as a historical subject. The stra- 
tegic concept of "one nation, one state" 
must be recognized as one without a 
future. Otherwise we will witness a 
chain reaction in which each ethnic 
group proclaims its territorial inde- 
pendence and the country is broken 
into ethnic segments. This concerns 
even Russians living inside Russia 
who do not enjoy self-government. It is 
absolutely necessary today that a new 
national-territorial approach be 
worked out--a sort of "Union of Peo- 
ples" or "Federation of Lands." This 
will provide equal rights to citizens 
and members of all ethnic communi- 
ties and territories, and satisfy their 
national and cultural demands. 
Table 7: What does Russia Represent 
Territorially? (in percent) 
Region 
Ulan-Ude 
Russians 
others 
Orenburg 
Russians 
others 
Ufa 
Russians 
others 
Petro-zavodsk 
Russians 
others 
Cherkessk 
Russians 
others 
Yakutsk 
Russians 
others 
Stavropol 
Russians 
others 
Russia is the territory of.. . 
A B C D 
Notes: A . . . the USSR; B . . . the Russian Federation; 
C . . . the Russian Federation minus the autonomous 
regions; D Hard to answer. 
Source: Survey research of the Centre of Sociology of 
Interethic Relations, Institute for Sociopolitical 
Research, Russian Academy of Science- 
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